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October saw the unveiling over three days of the British Government’s review of national security. First a strategy document, then more detail on means, then resource provision 
as part of the wider Comprehensive Spending Review. This elaborate choreography was 
presumably designed to show that decisions on security and defence in particular were 
not simply resource determined, though the critics were unconvinced and others like me 
wondered what strategy meant without resource constraint. The results and the associated 
documentation illuminate the challenges in addressing Britain’s future international role.
The titles of the two-part security Review are interesting: “Securing Britain/A Strong Britain in an 
Age Of Uncertainty”. Why is the age uncertain? The Review identifies that – rightly – an increasingly 
information driven, networked world brings with it both risks and opportunities in which security will 
become more complex. We might note in passing that in the Review this complexity is contrasted with 
the Cold War “when we faced an existential threat from a state adversary through largely predictable 
military or nuclear means”. In fact for much of the Cold War security policy had to tackle a range of 
risks and challenges and the Cold War itself was at times anything but predictable. Personally I would 
trade an existential threat for more complexity any time; but the challenge of the post Cold War world 
is to find a way to anchor our security policy.
The starting point of the national security review, as in all such exercises, is:
“...a hard-headed reappraisal of our foreign policy and security objectives and the role 
we wish our country to play, as well as the risks we face in a fast-changing world”
Four paragraphs on we find:
“The National Security Council has reached a clear conclusion that Britain’s national 
interest requires us to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence.” 
While the Foreword to the Strategic Defence and Security Review begins:
“Our country has always had global responsibilities and global ambitions.”
BRITAIN’S INFLUENCE
The shrinkage or otherwise of our influence is not it might be thought wholly in our hands. As a country 
we have a seat at every top table. Some of these tables are expanding to reflect changing economic 
and geo-political realities (e.g. the creation of the G20). Others we would like to see expanded (e.g. 
the number of Permanent Members of the Security Council). It is hard to see how these changes will 
not dilute British influence?
The Review audits Britain’s international role and identifies our strengths, including our security 
relationships with the USA, the reputation of our Armed Forces and intelligence agencies, our contribution 
to NATO, and our commitment to Official Development Assistance (ODA).
How much influence should and do these buy? As the Review recognises cautiously but by government 
standards interestingly: “the world of 2030 will be increasingly multi-polar”. A favourite posture of 
the British elite (if not of their American counter-party) of Britain as a transatlantic bridge is perhaps 
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a wasting if not wasted concept. Our relationship 
with the United States remains central for us but 
in a world in which the focus is shifting away 
from the Atlantic and Europe. And there are other 
uncomfortable truths. The financial crisis has perhaps 
most obviously damaged the reputation of a particular 
form of capitalism: the Anglo-Saxon model. As for our 
Armed Forces, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have shown up serious shortcomings in our capacity 
for strategic thinking and planning and ability to 
conduct counter-insurgency warfare. It may well 
be to apply the wrong perspective but possibly our 
expenditure on Development Assistance may not 
buy commensurate influence?
What of instruments of soft power? Here we have 
real strengths to be celebrated from the reach of the 
English language, and from key institutions such as 
(some) British universities, the British Council, and 
the BBC, including the World Service, and British 
culture more generally. All these we might expect 
to be safeguarded and developed.
SETTING STRATEGY
Perhaps reflecting the challenge in countering 
international terrorism and our experiences in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, strategy development and 
implementation in a security context is back in vogue. 
The present government’s security strategy is the 
third such document in three years. The government 
makes a number claims for beneficial change over 
its predecessor, including that:
 ■ It has developed a proper strategy, which  
 allows the Government to make choices  
 about the risks we face;
 ■ More emphasis is to be placed on spotting  
 emerging risks and dealing with them before  
 they become crises;
 ■ In contrast to the situation it inherited on  
 defence, it has begun the process “to bring  
 the defence programme back into balance”  
 and “to enable Britain to retain the best and  
 most versatile Armed Forces in the world” 
A “proper strategy” might perhaps have five 
characteristics:
 ■ A clear aim or purpose.
 ■ An understanding of the context or   
 environment in which the purpose needs  
 to be achieved.
 ■ A small number of broad strategic   
 directions or goals.
 ■ A set of actions of the various agencies   
 involved best fitted to achieve the   
 desired goals. This involves choices,   
 ideally made wherever possible on the basis  
 of comparative cost-effectiveness.
 ■ A feedback or learning mechanism, which  
 ensures the strategy is adapted in the light  
 of experience.
HOW DOES THE NEW STRATEGY MATCH 
THESE DESIDERATA?
To take some examples at different levels:
The stated aim of the National Security Strategy is: 
“to use all our national capabilities to build Britain’s 
prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the world, 
and strengthen our security.” A neat formulation but 
it might be thought to be a demanding combination 
in a changing international context and at a time 
of significant resource pressures. Perhaps there are 
trade offs between building prosperity and extending 
influence? But apparently not: the Review asserts 
that: “The networks we use to build our prosperity 
we will also use to build our security”.
---
In understanding contexts for the deployment of 
influence and power, we need to recognise that 
significant elements of the analysis and assessment 
used to inform government’s strategic decisions 
have proved false or over-optimistic, fundamentally 
because of a failure to understand the environments 
in which we plan to operate from the perspectives 
and values of those who live there rather than 
our own. This could be a fault of understanding 
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or decision-making processes or both. The Review 
helpfully recognises the importance of effective 
diplomatic reporting and intelligence, alongside taking 
decisions properly.
---
It is clearly right to place emphasis on spotting 
emerging risks and trying to deal with them before 
they become a crisis as well as on being more cautious 
in the exercise of power Here the language used 
in the Review is important – it talks of an age of 
“uncertainty”. As we have re-learned to our cost 
in the financial crisis, uncertainty is not the same as 
probabilistic risk. This makes the laudable effort in the 
review to assess possible future developments in terms 
of likelihood and as well as impact methodologically 
as well as practically fraught. It points, as the Review 
explicitly recognised, to “adaptable” structures. But 
flexibility and adaptability are expensive and as goals 
can quickly lead to an unwillingness to choose. In 
so far as it is achievable, spotting crises and dealing 
with them early requires effective cooperation on 
the ground and in Whitehall, and funding for 
preventative action.
---
In past national security strategies, there has tended 
to be a jump in the analysis from fairly high-level 
objectives to lists of capabilities defined in terms of 
existing institutions. Among the missing pieces in 
the argument has been which elements of influence 
and power are likely to be most relevant and cost-
effective given our priorities and the contexts we are 
seeking to affect. The basis of choices has rarely been 
clearly articulated. Analysing the cost-effectiveness 
of instruments of different character is certainly 
difficult but, if based on judgement, ideally that 
would be exposed. The complexity arises not only, 
of course, from trying to think about the future but 
because of the legacy of the past- the inheritance in 
terms of people, infrastructure and other investment. 
Because this Security Review has been conducted in 
parallel with the Spending Review, we can see choices 
manifested in terms of budgetary allocations. 
ALLOCATING RESOURCES
In addressing the coherence of analysis and resource 
allocation, there is the important qualification 
that departments have multiple objectives and 
responsibilities and it would be difficult to isolate 
budgets for national security. The headline numbers 
therefore need to be treated with caution. But we 
could rank the outcome and ask whether it fits the 
story line sketched above. 
The most striking headline number is that, within 
UK Development Assistance, support to fragile and 
conflict-affected states and to tackle the relevant 
drivers of stability is forecast to double from 
£1.9billion in the current year. The Conflict Pool 
to help prevent conflict and support post-conflict 
stabilisation is forecast to grow from £229 to £309 
million, although still perhaps small beer within the 
total security envelope.
If we compare Departmental programme and 
administration budgets in 2014/15 with those in the 
current financial year, international development is 
up 37%. Intelligence provision falls by 7.3%, defence 
by 7.5%, the FCO by 24% but in practice much less 
because responsibility for funding the World Service 
is to be transferred to the BBC and the licence fee 
(hardly a ringing endorsement of its centrality to 
our effort to sustain influence). While Home Office 
expenditure is heavily reduced, the aim is to limit the 
effect on counter-terrorism Police funding.
The conclusion might be that, compared with recent 
spending reviews, international and security affairs 
broadly defined have been given relative priority, 
but that in allocating the available resource the 
government is hemmed in by a commitment to 
international development expressed as a share of 
national income (always a dubious concept) and 
a legacy of over-commitment in the Ministry of 
Defence. We might wonder from the process of the 
Review whether the right lessons have been learned 
in relation to defence programming or the same issues 
of systemic over-programming may not be with us 
in five years time. 
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Within these numbers, there is to be a 34% cut in 
Whitehall administration budgets. There is certainly 
scope for doing things differently and more efficiently. 
But the litany of new initiatives in the Review sits oddly 
with the effort to hold down Whitehall spending. And, 
if the more strategic approach in the Review is to be 
delivered, there needs to be the capacity at the centre 
of government to think strategically, give impetus 
to cross-government effort, and ensure plans and 
programmes are developed and implemented. Past 
success stories, like the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 
involve substantial staff effort; other issues like the 
development of the “comprehensive approach” were 
arguably under-resourced. There needs to be a better 
approach to recruitment, training and development to 
build a cross-departmental national security cadre and 
the culture to underpin more effective co-operation. 
All of this involves administrative expense.
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
What might we conclude? The relatively stable 
environment in Europe is an immense prize to 
be sustained through effective relationships and 
Alliances. We need to sustain our counter-terrorism 
efforts and tackle new challenges particularly from 
cyberspace. Beyond this we have choices about the 
level of our engagement, the levers of choice and 
how we best operate in an increasingly multi-polar 
world. Some of the rhetoric about our position 
needs to give way to the promised realism. The shift 
towards prevention is attractive, if harder to do than 
to postulate. The government’s security review has 
much of value including an effort to define priorities. 
The focus now needs to move towards understanding 
what we are getting for the considerable provision 
made, particularly in international development and 
defence. This may throw up uncomfortable issues. ■
23
